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Suzette M. Malveaux

In a sea of law review articles analyzing the potential impact of the more rigorous federal pleading standard of
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, Charles Sullivan's PlausiblyPleadingEmployment Discriminationstands out for a number of
reasons. As an initial matter, Sullivan grapples with an important question plaguing the civil rights community
and the employment bar: does Swierkiewicz v. Sorema-the unanimous 2002 opinion that took a lenient
approach to pleading discrimination cases-remain good law post-Iqbal? Sullivan argues that Iqbal did not
overturn Swierkiewicz, leaving intact the ability of plaintiffs to plead employment discrimination without
alleging a primafacie case under the McDonnell Douglas test.
But Sullivan then considers the alternate view: assuming arguendo that Iqbal did overrule Swierkiewicz, what
should plaintiffs do to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim under this more rigorous pleading regime?
Sullivan offers a variety of approaches, each with strengths and weaknesses. This willingness to explore the
proverbial edge of the envelope makes this article a compelling read. It combines pragmatism, creativity, and
boldness at a time when many are struggling to make sense of the impact of the new federal pleadings standard
in the civil rights arena. Given the importance of pleadings as an access to justice issue, this article provides an
invaluable perspective.
The article first describes the evolution from notice to plausibility pleading and the potential deleterious effect
of the latter on typical individual disparate treatment employment claims. Sullivan describes the various
procedural and substantive criticisms of the plausibility standard, including concern that absent discovery,
individual employment discrimination cases will be unfairly dismissed because of information asymmetry
between the parties. Although to date empirical studies of Twombly's and Iqbal's impact on the viability of
employment discrimination and civil rights claims are mixed, this does not change the fundamental question
posed by Professor Sullivan: "whether alleging an identified action as being discriminatorily motivated
suffices." (P. 1643.) In other words, is it enough today for plaintiffs to plead what Swierkiewicz did?
Swierkiewicz involved a plaintiff who alleged intentional employment discrimination under Title VII and the
ADEA. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Thomas, the Court concluded that the plaintiff was not
required to plead facts establishing a primafacie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglastest to
sufficiently put the defendant on notice of plaintiff's claim. McDonnell Douglas provides a method of
establishing intentional disparate treatment through circumstantial evidence, but the Court made clear that the

test is "an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement."
In Bell Atlantic Cor. y. Twonibl and later in Iqbal, however, the Court shifted from requiring plaintiffs to
plead facts demonstrating that a claim was possible to demonstrating that a claim was plausible. The
plausibility standard has led many practitioners, commentators, and judges to wonder if an employment
discrimination claim that fails to plead a primafacie case can still set forth a plausible claim. Sullivan
concludes that "there is certainly good reason to believe that Swierkiewicz is good law," noting Twombly' s
favorable citation of its predecessor and lower courts' hesitancy to assume Swierkiewicz has been overruled in
the absence of clear direction from the Court. But Swierkiewicz's viability depends on how broadly or narrowly
it is interpreted-a conflict which has yet to be resolved.
So Sullivan analyzes a "plaintiff's worst-case scenario." (P. 1622.) Assuming Swierkiewicz is dead, how can a
plaintiff avoid dismissal for failure to state an intentional discrimination claim? One obvious way is to plead
facts establishing a primafacie case under McDonnell Douglas, consistent with Rule 11. Although the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is admittedly not a pleading standard, the primafacie
showing-which creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination-would seem to comfortably provide a
floor for pleading purposes, even assuming that Swierkiewicz is no longer good law.
As an alternative, a plaintiff may contend that he or she was treated worse than a comparator-someone
similarly situated to the plaintiff. Rather than accepting as true facts alleging discriminatory motive, a court
would accept as true facts alleging that a comparator was treated more favorably and, therefore, plausibly infer
discriminatory intent. Subject to Rule 11 limitations, this should suffice for plausibility pleading.
Another strategy available for plaintiffs in an overruled-Swierkiewicz world would be to plead facts showing
direct evidence of discrimination-a less likely option given modern discrimination's subtlety and subconscious
nature. Professor Sullivan contends that "[a]s applied to the pleading context, this preference for direct
evidence may satisfy plausible pleading by alleging this kind of evidence of discriminatory intent." (P. 1657.)
Finally, Sullivan offers a "more extreme" approach for plausibly pleading intentional employment
discrimination claims post-Iqbal, which he contends is not only permitted, but "invited" by the Court. (P.
1662.) Sullivan suggests that plaintiffs plead "that the phenomenon of discrimination is more common than the
courts might otherwise believe," as indicated by social science research. (P. 1662.) Plaintiffs must plead
sufficient facts to convince a judge that their claims of intentional discrimination are plausible, and can do so in
various ways. Sullivan's way is "simply pleading this social science as fact, thereby requiring the court to take
that fact as true." (P. 1663.) As evidence of the workability of this approach, Sullivan points to the Court's own
reliance on economic research in Twombly as the basis for concluding that the defendants' economic behavior
was as consistent with parallel conduct as a conspiracy. Perhaps social science research could nudge an
intentional discrimination claim from possible to plausible in a similar way. This could be particularly useful
where a judge's baseline assumption is that discrimination is rare and therefore implausible in comparison to
alternative, more benign explanations for a defendant's conduct.
This bold approach admittedly poses its own challenges. For example, in the event that an expert is asked to
opine about the general propensity of discrimination in the workplace, this may say little about the propensity of
a specific employer to discriminate in a specific case. At what level of generality should the factual allegations
apply? Moreover, courts may give little credence to expert testimony or social science research in the
discrimination context. The Court's most recent treatment of sociology evidence at the class certification stage
in Wal-Mart v. Dukes suggests an uphill battle. And the questions remain whether a court must accord the
presumption of truth to such legislative facts and, if so, what limits are appropriate.
Sullivan's final proposal raises more questions than it answers-which makes its contribution so important.
This article moves the ball forward in assessing the viability of employment discrimination claims post-Iqbal,

challenging readers to consider what is plausible in pleading.
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